正通投資團隊 - 投資台股的專家 » 私募股權

PRIVATE EQUITY(私募股權)：Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks That Warrant Continued Attention

admin — Sat, 11 Oct 2008 08:34:53 +0000

United States Government Accountability Office (簡稱GAO)

Report to Congressional Requesters

What GAO Found

Academic research that GAO reviewed generally suggests that recent private equity LBOs(leveraged buyouts ; 融資買斷) have had a positive impact on the financial performance of the acquired companies, but determining whether the impact resulted from the actions taken by the private equity firms versus other factors is difficult. The research also indicates that private equity LBOs are associated with lower employment growth than comparable companies. However, uncertainty remains about the employment effect—in part because, as one study found, target companies had lower employment growth before being acquired. Further research may shed light on the causal relationship between private equity and employment growth, if any.

Private equity firms have increasingly joined together to acquire target companies (called “club deals”). In 2007, there were 28 club deals, totaling about $217 billion in value. Club deals could reduce or increase the number of firms bidding on a target company and, thus, affect competition. In analyzing 325 public-to-private LBOs done from 1998 through 2007, GAO generally found no statistical indication that club deals, in aggregate, were associated with lower or higher prices paid for the target companies, after controlling for differences in the targets. However, our results do not rule out the possibility of parties engaging in illegal behavior in any particular LBO. Indeed, according to securities filings and media reports, some large club deals have led to lawsuits and an inquiry into the practice by the Department of Justice.

註：原本私募股權公司(例如凱雷、黑石)在收購其他企業時，都是單兵作戰，然而私募股權公司的高獲利也使得競爭者陸續加入，在優質收購目標有限，而欲收購者持續增加的情況下，私募股權公司的活動開始有了改變。原先規模龐大的收購目標，私募股權公司無法覬覦，因此它們開始合作，聯合作戰的方式使得它們有能力吃下這些大企業，另外，私募股權公司為了避免LBO活動使得財務槓桿比率過高，因此原本是針對特定富有人士籌資的私募股權公司，轉向公開化，也就是所謂的公開上市動作，轉向一般投資人籌資。

Because private equity funds(私募股權基金) and their advisers typically claim an exemption from registration as an investment company or investment adviser, respectively, SEC exercises limited oversight of these entities. However, in examining some registered advisers to private equity funds, SEC has found some control weaknesses but generally has not found such funds to pose significant concerns for fund investors. The growth in LBOs has led to greater regulatory scrutiny. SEC, along with other regulators, has identified conflicts of interest arising in LBOs as a potential concern and is analyzing the issue.

Before 2007, federal financial regulators generally found that the major institutions that financed LBOs were managing the associated risks. However, after problems with subprime mortgages spilled over to other markets in mid-2007, the institutions were being exposed to greater-than-expected risk. As a result, the regulators reassessed the institutions’ risk-management practices and identified some weaknesses. The regulators are monitoring efforts being taken to address weaknesses and considering the need to issue related guidance. While the institutions have taken steps to decrease their risk exposures, the spillover effects from the subprime mortgage problems to leveraged loans illustrate the importance of understanding and monitoring conditions in the broader markets, including connections between them. Failure to do so could limit the effectiveness and ability of regulators to address issues when they occur.

Why GAO Did This Study
Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks That Warrant Continued Attention
Highlights of GAO-08-885, a report to congressional requesters

The increase in leveraged buyouts (LBO) of U.S. companies by private equity funds prior to the slowdown in mid-2007 has raised questions about the potential impact of these deals. Some praise LBOs for creating new governance structures for companies and providing longer term investment opportunities for investors. Others criticize LBOs for causing job losses and burdening companies with too much debt. This report addresses the (1) effect of recent private equity LBOs on acquired companies and employment, (2) impact of LBOs jointly undertaken by two or more private equity funds on competition, (3) Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) oversight of private equity funds and their advisers, and (4) regulatory oversight of commercial and investment banks that have financed recent LBOs. GAO reviewed academic research, analyzed recent LBO data, conducted case studies, reviewed regulators’ policy documents and examinations, and interviewed regulatory and industry officials, and academics.

以上是本報告的摘要，Private Equity Report全文下載請按此

華爾街投資銀行為何對雷曼兄弟袖手旁觀﹖

admin — Thu, 09 Oct 2008 14:32:16 +0000

雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)的路最終走到了盡頭，倒得並不驚天動地，卻帶著絲絲嗚咽！殘酷的清算命運似乎正等著這家老字號投資銀行。

當然﹐你可以聚集數十位華爾街精英到紐約聯邦儲備銀行(Federal Reserve Bank of New York)開會商討拯救之道﹐但他們也無法改寫人類不可改變的天性…人的行為都是受自身利益左右的。

事實是﹐雷曼兄弟墜入破產保護符合所有人的狹隘利益──除了該行股東、債權人和員工。

過去的這個週末﹐雷曼兄弟的結局已經明顯變成了一個零和遊戲。不甘心就此放棄的雷曼兄弟還在掙扎──出售資產管理業務Neuberger Berman﹐將商業抵押貸款業務分拆成單獨實體。然而﹐該行仍然無法回避帳面上高達530億美元難以脫手的壞帳資產。

美國財政部早就明確表示，不會用納稅人的錢接這個燙手的山芋。英國的巴克萊銀行(Barclays)和美國銀行(Bank of America)同樣對此興趣缺缺。因此，雖然財政部已經盡力勸說雷曼兄弟的華爾街同行們出手相助，但結果依然是無人響應。

問題是﹐華爾街的投資銀行們憑什麼要拔刀相助﹖

想像一下你是美林公司(Merrill Lynch)首席執行長塞恩(John Thain)，和雷曼兄弟首席執行長富爾德(Dick Fuld)死攥著不肯賤賣不同，你在7月份就以2.2折的跳樓價，揮淚賣出了票面價值高達310億美元的債權抵押證券(CDO)﹔但你還是感到資金上捉襟見肘。

別忘了﹐鮑爾森當年沒提拔你當高盛(Goldman Sachs)的首席執行長。現在他跑來要你掏出數十億美元拉雷曼兄弟一把﹖你不買的話﹐巴克萊和美國銀行就可能便宜購入雷曼兄弟﹐然後和美林競爭！問題是，你自己可能都很快需要某家銀行來解救﹐這已經夠丟人的了。(後來美國銀行以440億美元收購美林)

當然，高盛首席執行長布蘭克費恩(Lloyd Blankfein)和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)首席執行長麥晉桁(John Mack)可以每人拿出了數十億美元，顯示一點高姿態。他們知道，在信貸市場冰封之際，下週一雷曼兄弟破產的消息會給市場帶來重大衝擊。

但這種“無私”行為也是有限制的。和雷曼兄弟一樣，高盛也有數十億美元砸在了這一問題債券領域，如果出資救助雷曼兄弟，那會違背高盛投資者和股東的利益。

雷曼兄弟的破產已經成為了一場諷刺劇。該行並不是籌不到外部資本才陷入破產的，雷曼兄弟的問題資產也不是無人問津，只是買賣雙方一直在價格上僵持不下。

當然，這530億美元的龐大資產是難以出手，但真肯賤價出售的話，總會有人願意接手的。這些資產現在還有十分之一或者一半的價值嗎﹖雷曼老總富爾德不敢正視事實，因為他知道如果一折賤賣這些資產，雷曼兄弟可能也同樣擺脫不了破產的厄運。

華爾街仍然有上百億美元的資本對這些資產有興趣，高盛、J.C. Flowers、Kohlberg Kravis Roberts、凱雷投資集團(Carlyle Group)、TPG或黑石集團(Blackstone Group)等眾多私募股權公司(Private Equity)、對沖基金(Hedge Fund ; 又稱避險基金)、高風險債務基金和主權財富基金手上都有錢。這些公司都虎視眈眈地在一旁等著，打算以清算價收購雷曼兄弟資產大賺一筆。

這就是為什麼雷曼兄弟會破產。雷曼兄弟破產了﹐該行的資產將出售給報價最高的買主，只有這樣才能讓買賣雙方都履行為自身利益而戰的責任。

但市場的集體利益又何在呢﹖難道他們不擔心資產規模高達6,000億美元的雷曼兄弟破產會引發一場金融市場災難嗎﹖

這聽起來可能有點嚇人﹐但華爾街顯然已經認定屆時的拍賣價格不會低得離譜。要不然﹐他們早就出錢收購了。

如果雷曼兄弟依據《破產法》第七章申請破產保護﹐華爾街大鱷們肯定會隨之跟進。在距離紐約聯儲不遠的各家投資銀行辦公室和會議室中﹐銀行家們可能已經在商談此事﹐準備在雷曼兄弟清算之際廉價競購後者資產。

在雷曼兄弟宣布破產保護後不久，英國第三大銀行巴克萊銀行以2.5億美元低價收購了雷曼兄弟在北美市場的投資銀行及資本市場業務，此外，巴克萊銀行還以15億美元的價格收購了雷曼兄弟位於紐約的總部資產和在新澤西州的兩個數據中心，可以預見的是…華爾街上的禿鷲們會瓜分雷曼兄弟尚帶餘溫的屍體﹐然後等著更多的不幸者重蹈覆轍。

正通投資團隊註記：個體經濟學教我們，政府不應出手干預市場，而該讓價格機能這隻隱身在市場幕後的黑手來主導，這樣才能達成經濟效率(達成柏拉圖最適境界)。然而政府不應該出手干預的前提是市場為完全競爭、非公共財、無外部效果，很可惜的是…多數人都只學到政府不應該干預，而沒有瞭解到政府何時該干預。另外，政府干預後又有可能會產生政府失靈現象，因此政府干預或不干預，其實都會有各種不同的意見。

以雷曼兄弟破產為例，受害者除了股東、債權銀行之外，還包括眾多不慎購買連動債的小投資人，當初政府干預不夠，使得眾多投資銀行發行了一堆錯綜複雜的衍生性金融商品(例如CDO、CDS)，才產生了此次嚴重的金融風暴，事後就算政府不干預，雷曼兄弟的資產賤價被其他金融大鱷所吞噬後，試問….受害者是窮人或富人？受益者又是窮人或富人？如果經濟效率滿足了，但是貧富差距因此而拉大，究竟是公平還是不公平？

政府應該不應該干預？這不是一個簡單的問題，正通投資團隊的註記，所要表達的僅是如此！

正通投資團隊 - 投資台股的專家 » 私募股權

PRIVATE EQUITY(私募股權)：Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks That Warrant Continued Attention

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華爾街投資銀行為何對雷曼兄弟袖手旁觀﹖

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